Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1989

Pan Energy aka Energy Catalyst Company v. Carl
Martin : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brenda L. Flanders, Alexander H. Walker III; Van Wagner and Stevens; Attorneys for Defendant.
Michael J. Petro; Zabriskie, Patton, and Petro; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Pan Energy v. Martin, No. 890400.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2701

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

D' 'C V"NT
KF '
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

BRIEF

iloico
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST
COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

]
]I
;

vs.

]

CARL MARTIN,

]i

Defendants and Appellees.

SUPREME COURT

!

]

Civil No. 890400

6J. /fb

BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Appeal from Ruling, June 12, 1989
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Honorable Ray M.Harding, District Judge
BRENDA L. FLANDERS
ALEXANDER H. WALKER III
VAN WAGNER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MICHAEL J. PETRO, for
ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO
3507 North University Avenue
Jamestown Square Suite 370
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-7680

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/
RESPONDENT
CARL MARTIN

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/
APPELLANT

mmm

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
PAN ENERGY, a/k/a ENERGY CATALYST
COMPANY,

SUPREME COURT

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
CARL MARTIN,

Civil No. 890400

Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Appeal from Ruling, June 12, 1989
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Honorable Ray M.Harding, District Judge
BRENDA L. FLANDERS
ALEXANDER H. WALKER III
VAN WAGNER & STEVENS
215 South State Street
Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MICHAEL J. PETRO, for
ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO
3507 North University Avenue
Jamestown Square Suite 370
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 375-7680

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT/
RESPONDENT
CARL MARTIN

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF/
APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.
Did the District Court err in granting the Order Dismissing
Action and Vacating Judgement to the defendants against the
plaintiffs which resulted in the dismissal of the Judgment
against the defendant, when Plaintiff had properly filed a
foreign judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act?
II. Did the District Court err in not granting full faith and
credit to the valid Oklahoma judgment properly filed in Utah,
contrary to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of United States
Constitution?
III. Did the District Court err in not applying Utah statute of
limitations as provided by the Utah Foreign Judgments Act, when
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution allows the
forum state to apply it's statute of limitation on foreign
judgments properly filed in the forum state?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGES
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION

vi

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDING

vi

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

vii

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1

ARGUMENT

2

CONCLUSION

19

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

20

ADDENDUM 1

Al - 1

ADDENDUM 2

A2 - 1

ADDENDUM 3

A3 - 1

ADDENDUM 4

A4 - 1

ADDENDUM 5

A5 - 1

ADDENDUM 6

A6 - 1

ADDENDUM 7

A7 - 1

ADDENDUM 8

A8 - 1

ADDENDUM 9

A9 - 1

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

PAGES

Bacon v. Howard,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 22 (1857)
Broderick v. Rosner.
294 U.S. 629 (1935)
:
Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich,
630 P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1984)
Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc.,
627 P.2d 72 (Utah 1981)
Data Management Sys.. Inc. v. EDP Corp•.
709 P.2d 377, (Utah 1985)
Davis v. Davis.
305 U.S. 32 (1938)
Purfee V. Duke,
375 U.S. 106 (1963)
Edison v. Lewis.
325 P.2d 955 (Okl. 1958)
Eschenhagen v. Zika.
696 P.2d 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
First of Denver Mortg. Investors v. Riggs,
692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984)
Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson.
611 P.2d 387 (1980)
Hamilton v. Seattle Marine & Fishing Supply.
562 P.2d 333 (Alaska 1977)
Hobelman Motors. Inc. v. Allred.
685 P.2d 544 (Utah 1984)
Jones v. Roach.
118 Ariz. App. 146, 575 P.2d 345 (1977)
Lillegraven v. Tengs.
375 P.2d 139 (1962)
x
M Elmoyle v. Cohen.
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839)
Matson v. Matson.
333 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 1983)
Milliken v. Meyer.
311 U.S. 457 (1940), reh'g denied.
312 U.S. 712 (1941)
Mitchell v. Cloyes.
620 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1980)
Morris Lapidus Associates v. Airportels. Inc..
240 Pa.Super.Ct. 80, 361 A.2d 660 (1976)
Morris v. Jones.
329 U.S. 545 (1947)
Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe.
331 U.S. 586 (1947)
Rhoades v. Wright.
622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980),
cert, denied. 454 U.S. 897 (1981)
iv

14, 16
11
10
8f 10
7, 8, 11
11
8
17
16
18
10
12
8
7
12
14, 16
7
11
17
7
7
15
15

CASES:

PAGES

Roche v. McDonald,
275 U.S. 449 (1927)
Salmeri v. Salmeri,
554 P.2d 1244, (Wyo. 1976)
Strictland v. Watt,
453 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1972)
Thorley v. Superior Court, County of San Diego.
78 Cal.App.3d 900, 144 Cal.Rptr. 557 (1978)
Townsend v. Jemison.
50 U.S. (9 How.) 407 (1950)
Underwriter's Nat'l Assurance Co. v.
North Carolina Life and Accident and
Health Ins. Guaranty Ass'n,
445 U.S. 691 (1982)
Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb,
337 U.S. 38 (1949)
Van Kleek Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co.,
24 Utah 2d 63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970)
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,
345 U.S. 514 (1953)
STATUTES:

16, 17
7
15
9
14

8, 11
16, 17
8
15, 16
PAGES

28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1977)
28 U.S.C. 1332 (19 )
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 § 735, 759 (1988)
U.S. Const, art. IV S 1
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3), (1986 Supp)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1977)
Utah Code Ann. S 78-22a-l (1983)
Utah Code Ann. S 78-22a-2 (1983)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3 (1986)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-5 (1986)
MISCELLANEOUS:

2
9
3
2, 6, 11
v
5
2, 3
3
4
4, 6
PAGES

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 99 (1969) . . 11, 12
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws S 106 (1969) . . . . 8

v

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

PAN ENERGY, f/k/a ENERGY CATALYST
COMPANY,

1

SUPREME COURT

1

Civil No. 87-1916

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
CARL MARTIN,
Defendants and Appellees.
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Appeal from Ruling, June 12, 1989
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County
Honorable Ray M.Harding, District Judge

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3), (1986 Supp).

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is based upon a judgment rendered in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma and properly
filed in Utah under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

The Fourth

Judicial District Court of Utah County granted a Motion to Stay
Execution once it received an order dated July 14, 1988 from the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma stating
that the Oklahoma judgment was now dormant in Oklahoma.

The

Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County granted the
vi

defendant's Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment on or
about June 12, 1989-

Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of

Appeal with the Fourth Judicial Court as Directed by the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure on July 12, 1989.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about September 21, 1982, Plaintiff/Appellant, Pan
Energy, obtained a judgment against Defendant/Respondent, Carl
Martin in the United Stated District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma.
On or about August 20, 1987, Plaintiff/Appellant commenced
an action under Utah Law by the filing of the Foreign Judgment.
The Foreign Judgment was entered and notice was given on or about
August 24, 1987.
A Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was issued by
the District Court on September 22, 1987 and was served upon the
Defendant/Respondent.

The two parties entered into a

Stipulation continuing the Supplemental Proceedings without a
date until such time as the Defendant/Respondent obtained a
hearing before the United States District Court before the
Northern District of Oklahoma as to the propriety of its Motion
to Vacate the Oklahoma Judgment on the grounds of statutory
limitation.
The District Court based upon the Stipulation of the
parties, stayed the action between the Plaintiff/Appellant and
the Defendant/Respondent pending resolution of the defendant's
vii

motion to distinguish the original Oklahoma Judgment, the
Defendant/Respondent was required to post a $57,000 bond in the
form of a letter of credit from a Utah Banking Institution.
On or about July 14, 1988, the Oklahoma Court ruled that
the original judgment was dormant and thereby not enforceable
because no Writ of Execution had been filed within Oklahoma's
five year limitation period for enforcing judgments.

However,

the Oklahoma Court specifically found that its ruling did not
determine the enforceability of the Foreign Judgment in Utah, but
stated that the status of the Utah Foreign Judgment must be
determined according to Utah Law.
On or about August 11, 1989, Plaintiff/Appellant filed the
instant Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals.

viii

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment granted in
favor of the Defendant/Respondent was improper,

A valid judgment

from any of Utah sister states or any of the Federal courts
should be given full faith and credit in Utah.

The Utah Foreign

Judgment Act is the controlling statute in Utah when a valid
foreign judgment is properly filed in one of the District Courts
in Utah.

The Plaintiff/Appellant properly filed a judgment

rendered in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma in the Fourth District Court for Utah
County, State of Utah.

Once that judgment has been filed it

becomes a Utah lien and is subject to all laws in Utah that
govern the enforcement of judgment liens.

The statutes that

control the enforcement of judgment liens in Utah are applied
equally to domestic as well as foreign judgments liens in Utah.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution of the
United States requires no more or no less.

When there is a

conflict of law between the foreign State's statute of limitation
and the forum State's statute of limitation, the forum State's
statute controls.
The Motion to Dismiss Action and Vacate Judgment granted by
the Fourth District Court should not be affirmed in favor of the
Defendant/Respondent.

But, rather, the Plaintiff/Appellant

should be allowed to enforce it's valid Utah lien against the
Defendant/Respondent in compliance with the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act.
1

ARGUMENT

I.
THE MOTION DISMISSING ACTION AND VACATING JUDGMENT WAS
IMPROPER UNDER THE UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT.
The Supreme Court should reverse the District Court's entry
of the Motion Dismissing Action and Vacating Judgment.

Further,

the Supreme Court should remand the case and order that the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act1 statutes are controlling once a foreign
judgment has been properly filed, as in this case. Article IV §
1 of the Untied States Constitution provides that "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."

U.S.

Const, art. IV § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1977).

A.
The filing of the Oklahoma judgment in Utah was timely
and properly filed to give it lien judgment status in Utah.
Pan Energy, brought a civil action against the above named
defendant April 23, 1982. On or about September 21, 1982 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma rendered a judgment in favor of Pan Energy.
the judgment is of main concern here.

The date of

The Oklahoma statute of

limitation allows five years for execution of the judgment from
the date that a judgment is rendered.

The effective duration of

an Oklahoma judgment is controlled by that state's dormancy
1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l - 8 (1983).
2

statute, which has been codified as
735, 759 (1988).2

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12 §

The time period that the Oklahoma statute

allowed for the collection of this judgment began on September
21, 1982 and ran through September 21, 1987.
Pan Energy commenced this action under Utah Law by the
filing the Oklahoma judgment under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act3
on or about August 20, 1987.

Section 78--22a-2 of the Foreign

Judgment Act describes the process for filing a foreign judgment
as follows:
Definition - Filing status of foreign judgments.
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, "foreign judgment"
means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the
United States or of any other court whose acts are
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in
accordance with an appropriate act of Congress or an
appropriate act of Utah may be filed with the county
clerk of any county in Utah. The clerk of the district
court shall treat the foreign judgment in all respects
as a judgment of a district court of Utah. A judgment
filed under this chapter has the same effect and is
subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, setting aside, or
staying, as a judgment of a district court of this
state and is subject to enforcement and satisfaction in
like manner.4
These requirements were met at the time of the filing.5

The

notice of a foreign judgment was entered on or about August 24,
1987.6

Section 78-22a-3 of the Utah

Code provides that:

2

See Addendum 1.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-l (1983).

4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-2 (1983) emphasis added.

5

See Addendum 3.

6

See Addendum 4.

3

Notice of filing.
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor,
at the time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an
affidavit with the clerk of the district court stating
the last known post-office address of the judgment
debtor and the judgment creditor.
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and
affidavit, the clerk of the district court shall notify
the judgment debtor that the judgment has been filed.
Notice shall be sent to the address stated in the
affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the notice
is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall
include the name and post-office address of the
judgment creditor and the name and address of the
judgment creditor's attorney, if any.
(3) No execution of other process for the enforcement
of a foreign judgment filed under this chapter may
issue until 30 days after the judgment is filed.7
This notice was sent to the judgment debtor (Carl Martin) at his
last known address by court clerk on or about August 24, 1987.8
Personal service was also given concerning this action on or
about September 30/ 1987.9

Once the judgment has been filed

under the above statute it becomes a lien as stated in Section
78-22a-5, which provides that:
Lien.
(1) A Foreign judgment filed under this chapter becomes
a lien as provided in section 78-22-1 if a stay of
execution has not been granted.
(2) If the requirements of this chapter are satisfied,
the foreign judgment becomes a lien upon the judgment
debtor's property on the date it is docketed.1 °
7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-3 (1986) (emphasis added).

8

See Addendum 3.

9

See Addendum 5.

10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22a-5 (1986) (emphasis added).
4

Once the foreign judgment becomes a lien, § 78-22-1 of the Utah
code controls as to the length of time the lien holder has to
enforce the judgment.

Section 78-22-1 provides that:

Lien of judgment.
From the time judgment of the district court or circuit
court is docketed and filed in the office of the clerk
of the district court of the county it becomes a lien
upon all real property of the judgment debtor, not
exempt from execution, in the county in which the
judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or by him
thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien.
A transcript of judgment rendered in a district court
or circuit court of this state, in any county thereof,
may be filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of
the district court of any other county, and when so
filed and docketed it shall have, for purposes of lien
and enforcement, the same force and effect as a
judgment entered in the district court in such county.
The lien shall continue for eight yesars unless the
judgment is previously satisfied or unless the
enforcement of the judgment is stayeid on appeal by the
execution of a sufficient undertaking as provided by
law, in which case the lien of the judgment ceases.11
The judgment was properly and timely filed in Utah.

The

effective dates for the judgment from Oklahoma were September 21,
1982 through September 21, 1987.

Therefore, the judgment of

Utah's sister state of Oklahoma was in effect and of legal force
when it was filed in Utah.

The Defendant/Respondent has argued

that Utah should give full faith and credit to the July 14,
198812 ruling of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, but not the original judgment issued by
that same Court on or about September 21, 1982.13

The full faith

11

Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (1977) (emphasis added).

12

See addendum 9.

13

See addendum 2.
5

and credit clause does not allow Utah to choose which judgments
of a sister state Utah will enforce, but is bound to enforce them
as they come to the state.

The original judgment against the

judgment debtor should be given full faith and credit as the
constitution of the United States requires.14

Accordingly, the

appropriate effective time for enforcement of this judgment lien
in Utah began on September 21, 1982 and continues through
September 21, 1990.
The Plaintiff/Appellant did not choose Utah as the forum to
bring this action, but rather, followed the judgment debtor to
this state.

The Plaintiff/Appellant should not be penalized for

using the appropriate laws of the state that the judgment debtor
has chosen to live.

B.
The Motion for Stay of Execution of the Utah lien was
proper only to determine if the Oklahoma judgment was valid.
Once a valid judgment of a sister state is filed in a
district court of Utah it becomes a lien in Utah.

Section 78-

22a-5, provides in the pertinent part that "(1) A Foreign
judgment filed under this chapter becomes a lien as provided in
section 78-22-1 if a stay of execution has not been granted."

No

Stay of execution had been granted at the time of the filing of
the foreign judgment and therefore, the judgment became a lien in
Utah.
This Court has addressed the question of reexamination of

14

U.S. Const, art. IV S 1.
6

foreign judgments in the Data Management Systems, Inc.15 case in
which Data Management Systems obtained a default judgement
against EDP a Utah corporation doing business in Wisconsin.

The

Wisconsin judgment was filed in Salt Lake County for the purpose
of enforcement, pursuant to our Utah Foreign Judgment Act.

EDP

claimed it was not aware of the judgment until it was filed in
Utah and Data Management Systems sought enforcement of the lien
that the filing created.

This Court stated that:

Neither Rule 60(b) nor 78-22a-2 should be interpreted
in a manner which defeats the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. . . .
Neither Rule 60(b) nor our Utah Foreign judgment
Act allows our Utah courts to reopen, reexamine, or
alter a foreign judgment duly filed in this state,
absent a showing of fraud or lack of jurisdiction or
due process in the rendering state. Only those
defenses may be raised to destroy the full faith and
credit owed to the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced under the Foreign Judgments Act. Morris v.
Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 67 S.Ct. 451, 91 L.Ed. 488 (1947);
Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244, 1248 (1976);
Matson v. Matson, Minn. 333 N.W.2d 862 (1983); Morris
Lapidus Associates v. Airportels, Inc., 240
Pa.Super.Ct. 80, 361 A.2d 660, 664 (1976); Jones v.
Roach, 118 Ariz. 146, 575 P.2d 345 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1977).
Utah's Foreign Judgment Act does not diminish the
finality of foreign adjudications or the full faith and
credit obligation owned thereon. It cannot create
substantive rights in a judgment debtor which conflict
with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. No power is
conferred upon our state courts to entertain a Rule
60(b) motion for relief from a foreign judgment in
order to avoid its enforcement, except to the extent
permitted by full faith and credit. The rights and
defenses preserved by the Act are only those which the
debtor may constitutionally raise. To interpret the
language of our statute otherwise would not afford any
finality to foreign judgments and would be contrary to
15

Data Management Svs., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377,
(Utah 1985).

7

the constitutional mandate.16
The Utah Courts should not reexamine the judgments of her sister
states.

This Court in EDP has also given guide lines for Utah

Courts to follow in evaluating the foreign judgment filed in
Utah as follows:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not prevent
the judgment debtor from collaterally attacking a
foreign judgment on the ground of fraud or want of
jurisdiction or due process of law. Hobelman Motors,
Inc. v. Allred, Utah, 685 P.2d 544 (1984); Van Kleek
Creamery, Inc. v. Western Frozen Products Co., 24 Utah
2d 63, 465 P.2d 544 (1970). . . . But, although our
Court may inquire into the jurisdictional basis of a
foreign judgment , a determination by the rendering
state on the issue of jurisdiction is res judicata when
that issue is fully and fairly litigated there.
Underwriter's National Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 70506, 102 S.Ct. at 1366-67; Purfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. at
111-113, 84 S.Ct. at 245-46; Clarkson v. Western
Heritage, 627 P.2d at 74.17
The issues a Utah Court considers are if the foreign court had
jurisdiction, if the foreign state allowed both parties access to
due process of the law and if there was an absence of fraud in
the judgment.
The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts explains that "[a]
judgment will be recognized and enforced in other states even
though an error of fact or of law was made in the proceedings
before judgment, except as stated in § 105."18

This Court has

stated in EDP that if a foreign court has made an err or mistake
16

EDP, 709 P.2d 377 at 381.

17

EDP, 709 P.2d 377 at 379.

18

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 106 (1969).
Section 105 ,of this same Restatement is titled Judgment Rendered
by Court Laking Competence.
8

of law the Utah Courts will enforce the judgment.

"Even if it

appears that the rendering court has erred or ruled contrary to
statute, we will not refuse to enforce that determination when
that court has fundamental jurisdiction.

Thorley v. Superior

Court. County of San Diego, 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 910, 144 Cal.Rptr.
557, 563 (1978)."

The U.S. District Court In Oklahoma had

jurisdiction over the persons, because Pan Energy and Carl Martin
had diverse citizenship.19

Pan Energy is a corporation in

Montana2 ° doing business in Oklahoma2 x and Carl Martin was a
resident of Idaho.22

The same Court had jurisdiction over the

subject mater of this litigation.

This siction was brought

against Mr. Martin because of his failure to repay a debt.
Therefore, The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma had jurisdiction over this litigation and Utah should
give full faith and credit to it's judgment.

C.
The most recent finding of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma demonstrate the validity of
it's judgment at the time the Oklahoma judgment was filed in
Utah.
The U.S. District Court in Oklahoma handed down a decision
on July 14, 1988 that ordered "the judgment entered against
Defendant on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable.
19

Defendant's

28 U.S.C. 1332 (1986).

2

° Pan Energy changed its name from Energy Catalyst Company
to Pan Energy Resources, Inc, March 16, 1984. See addendum 6.
21
22

See addendum 7.
See addendum 8.
9

Motion to Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained."23
Specifically, in footnote 3 on page 4 of that opinion Judge
Thomas R. Brett District Court Judge stated that, " Tfjhe Court
does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment in Utah or
Idaho.

That issue is determined bv Utah's and Idaho's law

regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability."24

In

addition, Judge Brett stated that "Oklahoma strictly applies her
dormancy statutes to foreign judgments.

Chandler-Frates & Reitz

v. Kostich, 630 P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1984). "25

Utah should apply

it's Foreign Judgment Act strictly to all foreign judgments.
This would allow a valid foreign judgment properly filed in the
State of Utah the same grounds and time limits to gain
enforcement of the Utah lien as is prescribed for all domestic
judgments.

That would ensure that the Full Faith and Credit

Clause is completely followed in this state.

II. UTAH GRANTS FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE JUDGMENTS OF SISTER
STATES.
Utah Courts have continually complied with the
constitutional requirement to give full faith and credit to her
sister state's valid court judgments.26

This Court stated that:

The final determinations by the courts of one state are
23

See addendum 9.

24

See addendum 9 at 4 (emphasis added).

25

See addendum 9 at 3.

26

Clarkson v. Western Heritage, Inc.. 627 P.2d 72 (Utah
1981); Fullenwider Co. v. Patterson. 611 P.2d 387 (1980).
10

entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of its
sister states. U.S. Const, art. IV § 1; Underwriter's
National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life and
Accident and Health Insurance Guaranty Association. 445
U.S. 691, 102 S. Ct. 1357, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982);
Purfee V. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d
186 (1963); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61 S.Ct.
339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940), reh'q denied, 312 U.S. 712,
61 S.Ct 548, 86 L.Ed 1143 (1941). . . . The credit we
afford final judgments is generously full and not
parsimoniously partial Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32,
40, 59 S.Ct. 3,6, 83 L.Ed. 26 (1938).27
In the instant case a valid judgment was rendered in a U.S.
District Court in Oklahoma and at the time this judgment was
filed in Utah the Oklahoma judgment was still valid.28

The

filing of the original judgment in Utah created a Utah lien that
should be enforced according to the Utah Foreign Judgments Act.

A.
Utah's Laws should be used in determining the method of
enforcement for a Utah lien.
The Restatement of Conflicts Laws provides that "[t]he local
law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of
another state is enforced."29

The rational behind this section

is described in comment a, b and c of § 99, which states:
a.
Rational. The methods by which a sister State
judgment is to be enforced are determined by local law
of the forum, subject to the qualification that they
cannot be made so complex and expensive as to make
enforcement of a sister State judgment unduly
difficult. Broderick v. Rosner. 294 U.S. 629 (1935). .
b.

Method of enforcement.

The local law of the forum

27

EDP, 709 P.2d at 379.

28

See addendum 2 and 3.

29

Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 99 (1969).
11

determines whether a foreign judgment for recovery of
money can be enforced only by bringing a new action
upon the judgment in the state of the forum and by
obtaining a new judgment there (see § 100). . . . The
local law of the forum also determines the methods
for enforcing a foreign judgment providing for the
recovery of property or ordering the defendant to do
some act other than the payment of money (see § 102).
c.
Federal judgments. By act of Congress, Judgments
for the recovery of money or property rendered in a
federal district court may be registered in another
district without the necessity of bringing an action
and obtaining a new local judgment. Judgments so
registered "have the same effect as a judgment of the
district court of the district where registered and may
be enforced in like manner." (28 U.S.C. S 1963). . .
3 0

.

This restatement demonstrates that the prevailing thinking in
this area of the law is that the forum state applies it's own
procedures to enforce a judgment that is correctly filed in the
forum state.

The Supreme Court of Alaska has expressed this same

viewpoint in the Lillearaven v. Tenas31 case when they stated "it
being the traditional approach of the American courts to
distinguish between substance and procedure and hold that
procedure matters are governed by the law of the forum."32

The

method of enforcement is a matter of procedure and should
therefore, be governed by the forum states laws.

In the case at

bar, the lien laws of Utah should govern the procedures by which
the foreign judgment now a Utah lien is enforced in the State of
Utah.
30

Id. comments a, b, c, (1969).

31

Lillearaven v. Tenas, 375 P.2d 139 (1962).

32

Lillearaven. 375 P.2d 139 at 140-41); Hamilton v.
Seattle Marine & Fishing Supply. 562 P.2d 333, 337 (Alaska 1977).
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III. UTAH'S STATUTES ARE THE APPROPRIATE STATUTES TO DETERMINE
THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT A JUDGMENT LIEN IS ENFORCEABLE IN THIS
STATE.
The Supreme Court of the United States has established
policies for the enforcement of foreign judgments in a sister
state.

These policies have been applied since very early times

The United States Supreme Court stated that:
Such being the Faith, credit and effect , to be
given to a judgment of one state in another, by the
Constitution and the act of Congress, the point under
consideration will be determined by settling what is
the nature of a plea of the statute of limitations.
Is it a plea that settles the right of a party on a
contract or judgment, or one that bars the remedy?
Whatever diversity of opinion there may be among
jurists upon this point, we think it well settled to be
a plea to the remedy; and consequently that the lex
fori must prevail. . . . It would be strange, if in
the now well understood rights of a nation to organize
their judicial tribunals according to their notions of
policy, it should be conceded to therni in every other
respect than that of prescribing the time within which
suits shall be litigated in their Court. Prescription
is a thing of policy , growing out of experience of its
necessity; and the time after which suits or actions
shall be barred, has been, from a remote antiquity,
fixed by every nation, in virtue of that sovereignty
by which it exercises its legislation for all persons
and property within its jurisdiction. This being the
foundation of the right to pass statutes of
prescription or limitation, may not our states, under
our system, exercise this right in virtue of their
sovereignty? or is it to be conceded to them in every
other particular, than that of barring the remedy upon
judgments of other states by lapse of time? The states
use this right upon judgments rendered in their own
Courts; and the common law raises the presumption of
payment of a judgement after the lapse of twenty years.
May they not then limit the time for remedies upon the
judgments of other states, and alter the common law by
statute. fixing a less or larger time for such
presumption. and altogether barring suits upon such
judgments, if they shall not be brought within the time
stated by statute? It certainly will not be contended
that judgment creditors of other states shall be put
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upon a better footing, in regard to a state's right to
legislate in this particular, than the judgment
creditor of the state in which the judgment was
obtained. . . . In other words, may not the law of a
state fix different times for barring the remedy in a
suit upon a judgment of another state, and for those of
its own tribunal? We use this mode of argument to
show the unreasonableness of a contrary doctrine. But
the point might have been shortly dismissed with this
sage declaration, that there is no direct
constitutional inhibition upon states, nor any clause
in the Constitution from which it can be even plausibly
inferred, that the states may not legislate upon the
remedy in suits upon the judgments of other states,
exclusive of all interference with their merits. It
being settled that the statute of limitations may bar
recoveries upon foreign judgments; that the effect
intended to be given under our Constitution to
judgments, is, that they are conclusive only as
regards the merits; the common law principle then
applies to suits upon them, that they must be brought
within the period prescribed by the local law, the lex
fori, or the suit will be barred.

It is, therefore, our opinion, that the statute of
limitations of Georgia can be pleaded to an action in
that state, founded upon a judgment rendered in the
state of South Carolina.33
The Supreme Court clearly expressed itself on the subject of
the forum state applying their own statute of limitation once the
foreign judgment has been brought into and enforcement sought in
the forum state.

The Supreme Court reinforces their comments in

a more recent case as follows:
Long ago, we held that applying the statute of
limitation of the forum to a foreign substantive right
did not deny full faith and credit, McElmovle v. Cohen,
13 Pet. 312 (1939); Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How. 407
(1950); Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22 (1857). Recently
we referred to H. . . the well-established principle of
conflict of law that 'If action is barred by the
33

M\Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327-28 (1839);
Bacon v. Howard, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 22, 25 (1857).
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statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be
maintained though action is not barred in the state
where the action arose.' Restatement, Conflict of Laws
§ 604 (1934)." Order of United Commercial Travelers v.
Wolfe. 331 U.S. 586, 607 (1947).34
The holding of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co.35 case was quoted by this
Court in the Rhoades v. Wright36 case as follows:
The rule that the limitations of the forum state
apply (which this Court has said meets the requirements
of the full faith and credit) is the usual conflicts
rule of the states. However, there have been divergent
views when a foreign statutory right unknown to the
common law has a period of limitation included in the
section creating the right. The Alcibama statute here
involved created such a right and contain a built-in
limitation. The view is held in some jurisdictions
that such a limitation is so intimately connected with
the right that it must be enforced in the forum state
along with the substantive right.
We are not concerned with the reasons which have
led some states for their own purposes to adopt the
foreign limitation, instead of their own, in such a
situation. The question here is whexther the Full Faith
and Credit Clause compels them to do so. Our
prevailing rule is that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not compel the forum state to use the
period of limitation of the foreign state. We see no
reason in the present situation to graft an exception
onto it. Differences based upon whether the foreign
right was known to the common law or upon the
arrangement of the code of the foreign state are too
unsubstantial to form the basis for constitutional
distinctions under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.37
Both Courts were expressing the same idea, that the forum state's
34

Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516-17 (1953).

35

id.

36

Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343 (Utah 1980), cert,
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
37

Wells, 345 U.S. 514 at 517-18; Rhoades, 622 P.2d 343 at
350; Strictland v. Watt, 453 F.2d 383, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1972).
15

procedures for enforcement should be used rather than the foreign
state's.

The Arizona Court of Appeals has also followed the

Supreme Courts finding in Wells in the case of Eschenhaaen v.
Zika.38

It added the that "[t]his is true not only for

limitations periods for filing causes of actions but also for
limitations periods for enforcing judgment."39
Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the United States Supreme Court
dissented in the Union National Bank v. Lamb40 case, but gave
some interpretation of the policy discussed here.

He stated

that:
The Court finds that Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S.
449, is "dispositive of the merits" of this case. I
agree that that case demands the remand of this one;
more that that can be found only by misconceiving what
this case is about or what Roche v. McDonald decided.

2. Considerations of policy lying behind the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, however, are by no means so
forcibly presented where the issue is simply whether
the forum must respect the limitation period attached
to a foreign judgment or whether it may apply its own.
This Court has accordingly held that a State may refuse
to enforce the judgment of another State brought later
than its own statute of limitations permits even
though the judgment would still have been enforceable
in the State which rendered it. M^Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13
Pet. 312; Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22.
3. Conversely, where the enforcement of a
judgment by State A is sought in State B, which has a
longer limitation period than State A, State B is
plainly free to enter its own judgment upon the basis
of State A's original judgment, even though that
38

Eschenhaaen v. Zika, 696 P.2d 1362 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).

39

Eschenhaaen. 696 P.2d 1362 at 1365.

40

Union Nat'l Bank v. Lamb. 337 U.S. 38 (1949).
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judgment would no longer be enforceable in State A. If
enforcement of State B's new judgment is then sought in
State A, State A cannot refuse to enforce it without
violating the principle that the State where
enforcement of a judgment of a judgment is sought
cannot look behind the judgment. That was the
situation in Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, and so we
there held.4 x
The Oklahoma Supreme has addressed the issue of conflict of
laws between two sister states.

In a 1980 case, the Oklahoma

Court refused to apply a Kansas statute of limitation to an
original probate of a will where disposition of property in
Oklahoma was at issue.

That Court stated that:

Finally, in regard to any question which exists
concerning the applicability of the Kansas one-year
statute of limitation to the proceedings in this case,
it is well settled that 'ordinarily, with respect to
limitation of actions, the law of the forum governs.'
Edison v. Lewis, 325 P.2d 955 (Okl. 1958). Oklahoma
has no applicable statute of limitation.42
Here, the Oklahoma Court allowed a longer statute of limitation
(no limit) than was permitted in the foreign state of Kansas (one
year).

The forum state's statutes apply to proceedings in the

forum state.
In a more recent case the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied
it's own foreign judgment statues.

In this case a Colorado

judgment was filed in Oklahoma according to that states foreign
judgment statutes.

That Court stated:

It is the procedure for enforcement that is being
activated, not the validity of the original
jurisdiction of the judgment.

41

Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 at 45-46.

42

Mitchell v. Cloyes, 620 P.2d 398, 402 (Okla. 1980).
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We, therefore, hold that the rendition of judgment in
the originating forum state starts the dormancy period
running when the Uniform Act is called upon or brought into
play. The Act in Oklahoma (12 O.S.1981, S 721) gives the
foreign judgment the same effect as a judgment of this
state.

We shall treat the instant Colorado judgment,
filled in Oklahoma as if it were rendered in Oklahoma
on the same date it was rendered in Colorado.

We hold, however, that foreign judgments, when
filed pursuant to the Uniform Act, become judgments of
this state for the purpose of enforcement.
Consequently, the language in § 735 which refers to
judgments "rendered" in Oklahoma should be construed to
include foreign judgments also. Therefore, a foreign
judgment which is filed in Oklahoma becomes dormant
five (5) years after it was rendered in the sister
state, If execution was never issued on the judgment in
Oklahoma. The instant judgment was rendered in
Colorado in January of 1977; as no execution was issued
thereon it became dormant in Oklahoma in January, 1982.
The date of filing of the foreign judgment is
irrelevant in determining whether it has become dormant
in Oklahoma. . . . By the time the creditor filed in
1982, the Colorado judgment had become dormant, and the
act of filing the judgment did nothing to revive the
judgment. The filing was effective, the Colorado
judgment was still valid, but unless the creditor had
execution issue within the five (5) year period after
the judgment was rendered, the judgment was
unenforceable in Oklahoma.4 3
Oklahoma administers it local statutes when it comes to foreign
judgment enforcement within that state.

Yet, in the case at bar,

this Court is asked to enforce Oklahoma's statute of limitation
within the State of Utah.
43

First of Denver Morta. Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d
1358, 1361-63 (Okla. 1984).
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The defendant in this case wants this Court to ignore the
overwhelming weight of established procedure in conflicts of law
cases and have the Utah Court apply Oklahoma statute of
limitations.

CONCLUSION
The District Court erred in granting the Motion Dismissing
Action and Vacating Judgement for the defendants,

A valid

foreign judgment properly filed under the Utah Foreign Judgment
Act should be given identical treatment as if it were a domestic
judgment.
THEREFORE, for the reasons stated hssrein the
Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah to reverse the Motion to Dismiss Action and
Vacate Judgment granted to the Defendant/Respondent, and remand
this action to the District Court for a finding that the Utah
Foreign Judgment Act is the appropriate law for enforcing foreign
judgments.
Respectively submitted this

• y ^-^

day
da] of September, 1989.

ZABRISKIE, PATTON & PETRO

(

l/M^i

Michael J. Petro
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1

Al -

1

Note 6
by court on execution growing out of
another action was not void. Id.
7.

Public lands
Secretary of Interior's retention of
right of approval of transfer of lease
executed under federal statute did not
prevent levy of general execution pursuant to judgment declaring lien against
owner of interest in lease, nor prevent
confirmation of execution sale subject to
right of approval by Secretary of Interior. Melish Consul. Placer Oil Mining
Ass'n in Red River v. Buik-Senator Oil
Co., 163 Okl. 20, 20 P.2d 879 (1933).

§ 734.

8. Third persons' property
Shotgun which was placed in keeping
of judgment debtor when owner of shotgun borrowed money from the judgment
debtor was not subject to execution levy
by judgment debtor's judgment creditors. Turner v. Brown, 197 Okl. 638, 173
P.2d 943 (1946).
9. Trust estates
Husband, acquiring legal title to wife's
separate land, holds it in trust for her
benefit, and it is not subject to execution
on judgment against him. Weitz v. Richardson, 125 Okl. 294, 258 P. 262 (1927).

Property bound after seizure

All real estate not bound by the lien of the judgment, as well as
goods and chattels of the debtor, shall be bound from the time they
shall be seized in execution.
R.L.1910, § 5152.

Source:
St.1893, § 4336.
St. 1903, § 4634.
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5968.

Historical Note
Comp.St.1921, § 694.
St.1931, § 441.
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4541.
Law Review Commentaries

Judgment lien on after-acquired property; priorities. 2 Okl. Law Rev. 518
(Nov. 1949).
Library References
Execution *»109.
C.J.S. Executions § 123.
WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface.
Notes of Decisions
sale of Oklahoma land under judgment
creditor's execution, a second execution
was issued on the Judgment, creditor's
involuntary bankruptcy petition against
1. In general
Land is bound from time it is seized judgment debtor filed more than four
months after first execution and within
under oiiginal execution, and alias writ
four months from second execution was
relates back to levy under first execuproperly dismissed, since under this section. Storrie v. McAlester Fuel Co.,
tion, lien under first execution bound
C.C.A., 133 F.2d 1003 (1943).
Where after dismissal of alleged credi- the land continuously thereafter, and
neither the debtor's permitting acquis!tor's injunction which had restrained

In general

1
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tion of such lien, nor the enforcement
tlieieof wilhin four months' period constituted an "act of bankruptcy" Storrie
v. McAlester Fuel Co., C.C.A., 133 F.2d
1003 (1943).
St. 1893, § 4336 (sec, now, this section) piovidcd that chattels wete to be
bound by the lien of a judgment "from
the time they shall be seized in execu-

§ 735.

tion," and the lien of an attachment issued out of the district court and levied
on a stock of goods by the deputy sheriff
had priority over that of an execution
issued out of the probate couit on the
same goods, and placed in the sheriff's
hands before, but not levied until alter,
the levy by the deputy. Burnham v
Dickson, 5 Okl. 112, 47 P. 1059 (1897).

Must be issued within five years or Judgment becomes
dormant—Inapplicable to municipalities

If execution is not issued and filed or a garnishment summons
issued as provided in Section 759 of this title within five (5) years
after the date of any judgment that now is or may hereafter be
rendered in any coutt of record in this state, or if five (5) years ha;
intervened between the date that the last execution on such judg
ment was filed or the date that the last garnishment s u m m o n s wai
issued as provided by Section 759 of this title, and the date that wri
of execution was filed or a garnishment summons was issued a
also provided in Section 759 of this title, such judgment shal
become unenforceable and of no effect, and shall cease to operat
as a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor. Provided, tha
this section shall not apply to judgments against municipalities
R.L. 1910, § 5153. Laws 1981, c. 120, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 22, § 1, eff. No^
1, 1988.
Historical Note
"judgment was filed" and "or a garnis
The 1981 amendment substituted "is
ment summons was issued" followii
not issued and filed as provided in Sec"writ of execution was filed."
tion 759 of this title" for "shall not be
sued out"; substituted "has intervened
Severability clauses, codification, i
between the date that the last execution
peal of conflicting laws and eff<
on such judgment was filed as provided
tlve/operatrve date provisions
by Section 759 of this title and the date
the writ of execution was filed as also
Section 6 of Laws 1981, c. 120 pi
provided in Section 759 of this title" for
vides that this act shall become effecti
"shall have intervened between the date
October 1, 1981.
of the last execution issued on such judgment and the time of serving out anothSection 3 of Laws 1988, c. 22 provic
er writ of execution thereon"; substitutfor an effective date.
ed "such judgment shall become unenforceable and of no effect" for "such
Source:
judgment shall become dormant"; and
St.1893, § 4337.
inserted "real" preceeding "estate".
St.1903, § 4635.
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5969.
The 1988 amendment, in the first senComp.St.1921, § 695.
tence, inserted "or a garnishment sumSt.1931, § 442.
mons issued" following "not issued and
filed", "or the date that the last garnishOrigin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4542
ment summons was issued" following
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Cross References
Discharge of money judgment liens upon appeal to Supreme Court, see § 706.2 of
this title.
Unemployment compensation, warrant filed for! payment of delinquent contributions as lien, see title 40, § 3-503.
Law Review Commentaries
Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law:
Judgments: Effect of modification of
Conflict of Laws—Uniform Enforcement
original judgment oi\ dormant judgment
of Foreign Judgments Act. 2 Okl. City
statute. 34 Okl.L.Rev. 413 (1981).
U.L.Rev. 98 (1977).
1983 decisions of interest pertaining to
real property. Martha L. Marshall. 55
Evolution of Real Property Law rclat
Okl.BJ. 699 (1984).
ing to lis pendens and judgment liens,
Statute governing judgments filed in
Dale L. Astle. 32 Okl.L.Rev. 812 (1979)
other counties, suggested by Bar AssociaJudgment liens: New legislation. El
tion committee. 23 Okl. Bar Journal
bridge D. Phelps. 50 Okl.B.J. 404 (1979)
1412 (Aug. 30, 1952).
Library References
Judgment «=»853.
C.J.S. Judgments § 532.
WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface.
Notes of Decisions
After-acquired property 8
foreign judgment in Oklahoma after dorAncillary proceedings 9
mancy period had expired did not vioBankruptcy 10
late full faith and credit clause of United
Burden of proof 24
States Constitution or due process clause
Cloud on title I f
of United States and Oklahoma ConstituConstruction and application 3
tions. First of Denver Mortg. Investors
Creditors' bill 12
v. Riggs, Okl., 692 P.2d 1358 (1984).
Dormant Judgment 4
Estoppel 25
This section providing that judgment
Foreclosure actions 14
shall become dormant if execution shall
Foreign Judgments 13
not be sued out within five years after
Fraud 15
date of any judgment is applicable
Money Judgments 16
against the state, and as so applied did
Municipalities 21
not conflict with constitutional provision
Obligations to state 23
that legislature shall have no power to
Partial payment 17
extinguish the indebtedness of any corPurpose 2
poration or individual to the state.
Running of period 5
Charles Banfield Co. v. State ex rel. FalSchool di»lrlct§
22
Special assessment Hen 18
lis, Okl., 525 P.2d 638 (1974).
Successive executions 6
Sufficiency of execution 7
Unemployment compensation tax war- 2. Purpose
rants 19
The purpose of this section was to
Validity 1
require party obtaining final determinaWorkers' compensation awards 20
tion of rights to exercise those rights
within i five years and to bar right to
process for enforcement of judgment in
1. Validity
absence of issuance of execution within
five years. North v. Haning, 204 Okl.
Refusal of district court to permit
creditor to enforce filed but unexecuted
321, 229 P.2d 574 (1951).
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Sebring v. Sterling, 198 Okl. 398, 179
P.2d 125 (1947).
This section is not a "statute of limitation" within rule that statutes of limitation are not binding on the state, but is a
"dormancy statute". State ex rel. Sebring v. Sterling, 198 Okl. 398, 179 P.2d
125 (1947).

3.

Construction and application
In granting right to have judgment
lien, legislature can prescribe conditions
that must be met by judgment creditor
to prevent dormancy of his judgment.
First of Denver Mortg. Investors v.
Riggs, Okl., 692 P.2d 1358 (1984).
Amendment in dormancy statute (this
section) which made it consistent with
prior repeal of revivor statutes did not
affect any accrued right of judgment
creditor or take away any cause of action of creditor who had no right to
bring revival action at any time. First of
Denver Mortg. Investors v. Riggs, Okl.,
692 P.2d 1358 (1984).

4.

This section prescribing limitations in
actions on judgments is restriction on
common-law right of action on judgment. Chandler-Frates St Reitz v. Kostich, Okl., 630 P.2d 1287 (1981).
There is no limitation other than that
of dormancy statute upon effective duration of a judgment. Id.
In granting right to action on judgment which did not exist at common
law, legislature can prescribe certain
conditions which must be met by all
judgment creditors if dormancy is to be
prevented and lien of judgment to be
continued. Id.
Statute of limitation is one of repose
and holder of right of action cannot, by
any act on his part, disturb the quiescence produced by running of period of
limitations, while dormancy statute constitutes condition imposed upon holder
of judgment which adheres to and is part
of judgment. Id.
Dormancy statute (this section) continued to run on original judgment which
erroneously assessed prejudgment interest at rate of 10% per annum instead of
6% statutory rate, since the trial court
was without authority, not without jurisdiction, to assess prejudgment interest at
the 10% rate, and since the court's subsequent entry of order correcting the balance due under the judgment was merely a clerical act, as opposed to modification of a void judgment and entry of a
new judgment. Id.
The legislature can fix certain conditions or requirements that must be met
by all judgment creditors if dormancy is
to be prevented and the lien of a judgment is to be continued. State ex rel.
T.12 O.S.A. M «30 to 1030-*

2

Dormant judgment
A "dormant judgment," for purposes
of this section, is one that remains unsatisfied but that has remained unexecuted
so long that execution cannot be issued
upon it without first reviving the judgment. Palmer v. Belford, Okl., 527 P.2d
589 (1974).
Judgment is not dormant at issuance
of alias execution, if five years did not
intervene since original execution, and
original execution issued within five
years
from judgment.
Ashur
v.
McCreery, 150 Okl. I l l , 300 P. 767
(1931).
Execution cannot be issued on judgment becoming dormant after five years.
Miller v. Melone, 11 Okl. 241, 67 P. 479
(1902).
5.

Running of period
Dormancy statute, if applicable, did
not start to run until after entry of deficiency judgment; and where deficiency
judgment had been entered less than five
years before filing of motion to set it
aside, motion was timely, even though
filed more than five years after entry of
original judgment foreclosing mortgage
and Hen on attached property not cover
ed by mortgage. Ingerton v. First Na
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa, C.A
Okl., 291 F.2d 662 (1961).
A judgment on which execution wai
issued after affirmance by Oklahoma Su
preme Court five years after date o
judgment was not dormant under Okla
homa statute so that execution could nc
be issued, where order overruling mc
tion for new trial had been entered dui
ing five-year period, since that orde
stayed execution for 30 days thereaftei
as respects validity of judgment unde
Bankruptcy Act. In re Cherokee Publi
Service Co., D.C.Ark., 20 F.Supp. 19
(1937), affirmed 94 F.2d 536.
Rendition of judgment in originatlr
forum state starts dormancy period rui
ning when Uniform Enforcement of Fo
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The 1987 amendment redesignated
subsection A, as subsection A, patagiaph
1; redesignated items 1 to 3 as items a to
c; insetted "executed by the sheriff following "written notice of sale" in item a;
inserted "shall be executed by the sheriff
and" following "The notice" in the second sentence of item b; substituted
"published in the county, or in case no
newspaper be published therein" for
"printed in the county, or in case no
newspaper be printed therein" in the
third sentence of item b; added para-

graph 2 under subsection A; redesignated subsection B as subsection B, paragraph 2; and added subsection B, paragraph 1.
Source:
St.1893, § 4343.
St. 1903, § 4641.
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5975.
Comp.St.1921, § 701.
St.1931, § 448.
Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4548.

Cross References
Realty, notice of sale of, see § 764 of this title.

sold shall, in his opinion, be insufficient to satisfy the judgment, he
shall levy the same upon lands and tenements, goods and chattels,
or either, as the law shall permit, being the property of the judgment debtor, sufficient to satisfy the debt.
R.L.1910, § 5160.
Historical Note
Source:
St.1893, § 4344.
St. 1903. § 4642.
Comp.Laws 1909. § 5976.

Comp.St.1921, § 702.
St.1931, § 449.
Origin: St.Kan.1889, par. 4549.
Library References

Execution <3=M36.
C J . S . Executions § 103.

Law Review Commentaries
Secured transactions:
Commercial
reasonability of secured party's sale of

collateral after default under UCC
§ 9-504(3). 29 Okl.L.Rev. 486 (1976).

Library References
Execution <s=»222.
CJ.S. Executions § 211.
WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface.
Notes of Decisions
Notice of sale f
Place of sale 2

1.

Notice of sale

Sale of attached chattels, in absence of
personal service of summons or appearance by defendant where case does not
allow service by publication, is void.
Empire Supply Co. v. McCann, 127 Okl.
195, 260 P. 44 (1927).
All parties must rely on and be governed by notice given of time, place, and
manner of judicial sale, duly published
as required by law. Dickinson-Reed-

§ 758.

Randerson Co. v. Markley, 117 Okl. 17,
244 P. 754 (1926).
Parties Interested in judicial sale have
no right to rely on agreement made with
officers, whose duty it is to conduct sale,
that he will notify them of exact time of
sale. Id.
Notice for ten days is to give mortgagor opportunity to pay debt and extinguish lien. Litz v. Exchange Bank of
Alva, 15 Okl. 564, 83 P. 790 (1906).
2.

Place of sale
On general execution personal property is sold where It is located. Brown v.
Neustadt, 145 Okl. 140. 292 P. 73 (1930).

Further levy when property taken Insufficient

When any writ shall issue, directing the sale of property previously taken in execution, the officer issuing said writ shall, at the
request of the person entitled to the benefit thereof, his agent or
attorney, add thereto a command to the officer to whom such writ
shall be directed, that if the property remaining in his hands not
222

§ 759.

Filing and Indexing of execution—Appraisement
property—Extension of Judgment lien

ol

A. When a general execution is issued and placed in the custody
of a sheriff for levy, a certified copy of such execution shall be filed
in the office of the county clerk of the county whose sheriff holdsuch execution and shall be indexed the same as judgments.
B. If a general or special execution is levied upon lands anc
tenements, the sheriff shall endorse on the face of the writ the lega
description and shall have three disinterested persons who hav<
taken an oath to impartially appraise the property so levied on
upon actual view; and such disinterested persons shall return to th
officer their signed estimate of the real value of said property
C. To extend a judgment lien beyond the initial or any subse
quent statutory period, prior to the expiration of such period, one o
the following shall be filed and indexed in the same m a n n e r a
judgments in the office of the county clerk in the county in whic
the judgment was rendered and in the office of the county clerk ii
each county in which the judgment was filed and the lien thereof i
sought to be retained:
1. a certified copy of a general execution upon the judgment; c
2. a certified copy of a garnishment summons issued against th
judgment debtor.
R.L.1910, § 5161. Laws 1981, c. 120, § 2; Laws 1988, c. 22, § 2, eff. No
1, 1988.
Historical Note
The 1981 amendment rewrote this section which prior thereto read:

"If execution be levied upon lands ai
tenements, the officer levying such e?
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Note
cution shall c,all an inquest of three disinterested r househoIders, who shall be
resident within the county where the
lands taken in execution are situate, and
administer to them an oath, impartially
to appraise the property so levied on,
upon actual view; and such householders shall forthwith return to said officer,
under their hands, an estimate of the
real value of said property."

execution thereon shall be filed and indexed in the same manner as judgments
in the office of the county clerk in the
county in which the judgment was rendered and in the office of the county
clerk in each county in which the judgment was filed and the lien thereof is
sought to be retained."
Source:
St 1893, § 4345.
St. 1903, § 4643.
Comp.Laws 1909, § 5977.
Comp.SU921, § 703.
St.1931, § 450.

The 1988 amendment rewrote subsection C which prior thereto read:
"C. To extend a judgment lien beyond the initial or any subsequent statutory period, prior to the expiration of
such period, a certified copy of a general

Origin: Gen.St.Kan.1889, par. 4550.

Law Review Commentaries
Title examination. Robert D. Crowe.
30 Okl. Bar Journal 2192 (Dec. 1959).
Library References
Execution «=>141.
Judgment «=>770, 795(2).

C.J.S. Executions § 106.
C.J.S. Judgments §§ 468, 490.

WESTLAW Electronic Research
See WESTLAW Electronic Research Guide following the Preface.
Notes of Decisions
Appraisal 3-6
mineral deed was "lands and tenements"
In general 3
under statute requiring appraisement of
Defects and Irregularities 5
"lands and tenements" before sale on
Disqualification of appraisers 6
execution. Cuff v. Koslosky, 165 Okl.
I n c u m b e r e d property 4
135, 25 P.2d 290 (1933).
Defects and irregularities, appraisal 5
Equity in land seized on execution
Disqualification of appraisers, appraismust be appraised. Hewitt v. Voils, 147
al 6
Okl. 270, 296 P. 447 (1931).
Incumbered property, appraisal 4
Lands and tenements 1
2. Personalty
Personalty 2
Appraisal of personalty upon which
Return 7
levy was made was not prerequisite to
Review 8
sale. Barker v. West Pub. Co., Okl., 268
P.2d 248 (1954).
1.

Lands and tenements
A mineral deed amounts to a separate
estate and is an "interest in land" within
statute under classification of lands and
tenements so as to require appraisement
before sale thereof upon execution and
levy. Cornelius v. Jackson, Okl., 209
P.2d 166 (1949), appeal dismissed 69
S.Ct. 412, 335 U.S. 906, 93 L.Ed. 440.
Undivided half-interest in mineral
rights and unaccrued royalties under

3.

Appraisal—In general
Appraisement of realty under order of
sale with appraisement in foreclosure
proceeding, which fixed total appraised
value at certain sum, "less taxes $
,
net appraised value $
," was sufficient, In absence of evidence showing
some taxes against the property. Taylor
v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
of Oklahoma City, 184 Okl. 600, 89 P.2d
349 (1939).
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As respects objections to confirmation
of sale, where mortgaged property is appraised by householders and is sold at
not less than two-thirds of appraised value, sale is valid, as respects question of
sale price, and court cannot inquire into
adequacy thereof so long as appraisement is permitted to stand. Rodolf v.
First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa, 182
Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (1938).
Where the court in a suit for specific
performance of a land contract imposes
a lien for taxes and assessments which
the purchaser should have paid and
which the vendor has paid to protect the
title, and provides for special execution
if the purchaser fails to pay within a
specified time, this section requires appraisement before sale. Bell v. Trosper,
182 Okl. 316, 77 P.2d 544 (1938).
As regards validity of execution sale
where amount of taxes, penalty, and cost
delinquent on property is in excess of
appraised value thereof, such property is
properly listed on appraisement as being
of no value. Wedgwood v. Boyd, 174
Okl. 531, 51 P.2d 299 (1935).
An order of sale under a final judgment is a species of execution and for
such reason real estate sold thereunder
should be appraised in accordance with
statutory requirements applying to sales
under execution. Given v. Owen, 73
Okl. 146, 175 P. 345 (1918).
Where, under the provisions of R.L.
1910, § 5177 (see, now, § 751 of this
title), execution was levied upon land
incumbered by mortgage, it was the duty
of the appraisers to estimate and return
the value of the property subject to the
mortgage, which was the value of the
rights and interests of the mortgagor
debtor in such property which alone
could be sold, and a sale thereof for
two-thirds or more of such appraised
value was valid. Alexander v. American
Nat. Bank, 54 Okl. 345, 153 P. 130
(1916).
4.

Incumbered property, appraisal
In execution sale of incumbered land,
debtor's equity in land over and above
incumbrance should be appraised. Miller v. American Bank it Trust Co., 171
Okl. 99, 40 P.2d 1074 (1935).
Sale of land on mortgage foreclosure
without appraisement, in absence of

waiver thereof, is void. Brown v. Sta
Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 133 Okl. 173, 21
P. 833 (1928).
Waiver in mortgages of benefits *
homestead exemption and "stay law
held not equivalent to waiving apprais
ment before sale on foreclosure. Id.
5.

Defects and Irregularities, a
pralsal
Denial of defendant's motion to vaco
an execution sale of his realty on gTour
that it was not appraised by three a
praisers as required by this section, b
cause one of appraisers did not actual
view the realty, was not reversible errc
where evidence did not show that pri
for which realty was sold was disprop*
tionate to the real value thereof, or tr
strict compliance with statute wot
have resulted in a different value bei
placed on the realty by the appraise
Baker v. Smith, 191 Okl. 491, 131 P.2d
(1942).
6.

Disqualification of appraise
appraisal
That one of appraisers of mortgap
property prior to foreclosure sale h
been issued a card by sheriff, purporti
to be an appointment of that apprar
as a deputy sheriff, did not invalid
appraisement, where appraiser receh
no salary as a deputy, never made
rests nor served process, and card v
considered merely as a courtesy ca
Rodolf v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
Tulsa, 182 Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (193
7.

Return
Mortgage foreclosure sale was not
valid because return of appraisem
failed to separately mention buildi]
affixed to land, when buildings w
considered by appraisers as part of n
ty and were again specifically mentioi
and considered in sale of persona
Zenith Limestone Co. v. Exchange Ti
Co., 175 Okl. 185, 51 P.2d 823 (19.
8.

Review
A finding of trial court in mortg
foreclosure proceeding that no gro
inadequate valuation had been pla
upon mortgaged property by apprai
would not be disturbed where It was
clearly against weight of evidence,
dolf v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co
Tulsa, 182 Okl. 426, 78 P.2d 296 (19
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ENERGY CATALYST CO.
Plaintiff,
82-C-496-BT

y

vs.

?|LED
c.\j ?7. \%b

CARL W. MARTIN,
Defendant.

^i P /

'Cv

"/ 4

J U D G M E N T
r( r

Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law filed this
date, IT IS ORDERED Judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff,
Energy Catalyst Co., and against the defendant, Carl W. Martin, in
the amount of $27,500.00, together with interest from July 17, 1981,
at the rate of 670 per annum, and interest at the rate of 157o per
annum from the date of Judgment until paid, in accordance with 12
^

O.S. (1982) §727.
ENTERED this **-'

^ a y of September, 1982.

r
TlfoMASRTBRETT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

United States District Court T ^ f l
Northern District of Oklahoma)
v.
I hereby certify that the foregoing
is a true COBV C . ti.e ordinal on file
in this Court.
..,_._ n, or,v

AO 132
(Rev. 2/81)

Exemplification Certificate

llmtrti States itatrirt Ohrort
for the
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
, Clerk of the United States District Court for the
JACK C SILVER
, and keeper of the records and seal thereof, hereby
NORTHERN
District of OKLAHOMA
certify that the documents attached hereto are true copies of
Judgment in c a s e f 82-C-496-B

I,

now remaining among the records of the Court.
In testimony whereof I hereunto sign my name and affix the seal of said Court, in said District at T u l s a
Okl ahoma
, this 13
day of
^Mfluaj
^
87

Clerk.

THOMAS R BRETT
, United States District Judge for the
, do hereby certify that,
NORTHERN District of—OKLAHOMA
whose name is above written and subscribed, is and was at the date thereof, Clerk of said Court, duly
appointed and sworn, and keeper of the records and seal thereof, and that the above certificate by him
made, and his attestation or record thereof, is in due form of law.

I,

August

1JL

, 19_£_Z

t^L
United States District Judge.

_ , Clerk of the United States District Court for the
I,
JACK C SILVER
, and keeper of the seal thereof, hereby certify that
NORTHERN
District of OKLAHOMA
whose name is within written and subscribed,
the Honorable _ THOMAS R BRETT
was on the 21
19 82 , and now is Judge of said court,
. day of
September
duly appointed, confirmed, sworn, and qualifed; and that I am well acquainted with his handwriting and
official signature and know and hereby certify the same within written to be his.
In testimony whereof I hereunto sign my name, and affix the seal ofsaidCourt at the city OLL_TUL S A
OKLAHOMA , in said State, on this J_3
day of .Aup^srf
^
j< 8 7

Clerk.
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1981 AUG 21* AM & 21*
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D I S t R f c t " ^ ^ ^ ^ ' ^ ^
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Energy Catalyst Co.,
Plaintiff

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

vs.
CIVIL NO

Carl W. Martin,

CV-87-1916

Defendant

TO:

Carl W. Martin
590 East 900 South
Mapleton, Utah 84663
Notice is hereby given to you that a Judgment was this date filed against

you in the above entitled matter.

Filing parties are as follows:

Judgment Creditor

Energy Catalyst Co.

Address:

P.O. Box 256, West Chester, Pennsylvania

Creditor's Attorney

Jeril B. Wilson

Address:

3325 N. Univ. Ave., Suite 200
Jamestown Sq., Clocktower Bldg.
Provo, Utah 84604
19 87
August
day of

Dated this

24th

BY THE COURT
WILLIAM F. HUISH, CLERK

JELY.

f

y<MfynC

Dwayne Case, Chief Deputy Clerk

19381
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Judgment against the defendant in the amount of $27,500 together
with interest from July 17, 1981, at the rate of 6% per annum and
interest at the rate of 15% per annum from September 21, 1982,
until paid, which Judgment has not been satisfied.
DATED this ^ / ^ d a v of September, 1987.

:i/C tfol~ILSON
ey for Plaintiff
ORDER
Upon application of plaintiff herein, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named defendant, Carl
W. Martin, appear before this Court in the Courtroom thereof, Provo,
Utah, on the 9th day of October, 1987, at the hour of BSffi^ a.m., then
and there to answer concerning the property of the defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pending a hearing on this Order,
said defendant is hereby restrained from disposing of his nonexempt property, including money.
DATED this X ^

day of September,
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AFFIDAVIT O F S E R V I C E

SERVED: C a r \ VA3. V Y l a r T \ l o

HOME: 5 9 0

DATE RECEIVED: ^

/

^

/

^

{.^OOS.^cxp^^^^

WORK:
LEFTWITH:
PROCESS:

LO\-Pe,

DATE SERVED: ^ 3 0 / ^ " 7

n^-VvoncWOndktr'in

Suppkmen-kLl
PrOC££d\r*p£>
.
REQUESTED BY:OfcJrv\ ' R U 3 v \ s a 7 ^ : ~
CASE: £ n e r a v / ( k i - a - L / & V - V
G ^ Y pocx v 4 \ ^
PLAINTIFF: ? a n £ n e r g y
DEFENDANT: Q ^ \ tf>. m a r f \ A
RETURN O F S E R V I C E
/ /

P E R S O N A L SERVICE by leaving a copy with the respondent in
person.

H^

P E R S O N A L SERVICE by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age
and discretion residing at the usual place of abode of the respondent s;

/ /

O N A C O R P O R A T I O N OR P A R T N E R S H I P or institution by leaving a
copy with a known agent or officer or some other qualifying agent as
listed in rule 4 of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

/ /

OTHER SERVICE

I served upon the respondent listed above on the date shown above in the
manner indicated above the process described above. I was at the time of this
service a duly qualified and action peace officer or a person over the age of 21
years and not a party to this action. I endorsed on the copy served the date and
place of service, and my name and official title if any.
Fees:
Service: 3 - 7^>
Mileage: 7- 5 " 0
Other:
Total: $ fl-<P5
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SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF MONTANA

RESTATED CERTIFICATE OP INCORPORATION

I , JIM WALTERMIRE, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e of t h e S t a t e of
M o n t a n a , do h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t t h e R e s t a t e d A r t i c l e s of
I n c o r p o r a t i o n of ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY, a Montana
c o r p o r a t i o n , and S t a t e m e n t on Adoption t h e r e o n duly e x e c u t e d
p u r s u a n t t o t h e p r o v i s i o n s of S e c t i o n 35-1-213» Montana Code
A n n o t a t e d , h a v e b e e n r e c e i v e d i n my o f f i c e and conform t o
law.

NOV, THEREFORE, I , JIM WALTERMIRE, a s s u c h S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e , by v i r t u e of t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n me by l a w ,
h e r e b y i s s u e t h i s R e s t a t e d C e r t i f i c a t e of I n c o r p o r a t i o n t o
ENERGY CATALYST COMPANY
changing
its
name
to
PAH ENERGY RESOURCES, I N C . , a M o n t a n a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
and
a t t a c h h e r e t o a c o p y of t h e R e s t a t e d A r t i c l e s
of
I n c o r p o r a t i o n and t h e S t a t e m e n t on Adoption t h e r e o n .
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ENERGY CATALYST CO.,

APR 2 3',$$'

Plaintiff,

Jack C. Silver, Clerk
N0

vs.
CARL W. MARTIN,
Defendant.

-

•!. S. DISTRICT COIPV

8 2-C - 4 9 6 - B
COMPLAINT

Comes now the plaintiff, Energy Catalyst Co., and
for claim for relief against the above named defendant shows
unto the Court as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Energy Catalyst Co,, is a Montana

corporation, qualified to do business in Oklahoma and
headquartered in Oklahoma.

The defendant is a citizen of

the State of Utah and the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000.00, exclusive of interests and costs.
2.

Jurisdiction of this United States District

Court is founded upon the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1332.
3.

On or about July 17, 1981, in the corporate

offices of the plaintiff, the plaintiff loaned the defendant
$27,500.00.
4.

Subsequent to July 17, 1981, the plain-tiff _

made repeated demands on the defendant for repayment but

ADDENDUM 8
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
-0ENERGY CATALYST CO.,

)

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. 82-C-496-D

-vs-

ANSWER

CARL W.. MARTIN,
Defendant.

)
)
-0-

COMES NOW the above named defendant and answers the
complaint of plaintiff on file herein as follows:
FIRST DEFENSE
That the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject
m a t- f- <=» r- r\f

4-U ^ -

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __^
day of May, -1982,
I served a copy of the within and foregoing ANSWER upon:
Patrick J. Malloy III, L'sq.
2431 East 51st Street, £103
Tulsa, Oklahoma 7410p
attorney of record in the above-entitled action, by depositing
a copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in
an envelope addressed to said attorney at the foregoing address.

/s/ Carl W. Martin
Carl W. Martin

ADDENDUM 9
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F I L b D
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PAN ENERGY, f/k/a
ENERGY CATALYST CO.,

)
)
Plaintiff,

jack C. Silver, Clerk
y.s. DISTRICT COURT

)

V.

)

CARL W. MARTIN,

)
Defendant.

JUL 1 4 1988 -

No. 82-C-496-B

)

O R D E R
This matter

comes before

the

Court

on Defendant

Carl

W.

Martin's Motion to Extinguish Judgment.1
On September 21, 1982, this Court awarded Plaintiff judgment
against Defendant in the amount of $27,500.00. Subsequently, the
Plaintiff has filed the judgment in both Utah and in Idaho.

After

filing the judgment in Idaho a writ of execution was issued in
Idaho, but never

filed.

However, nothing

in the

Plaintiff's

response brief indicates an attempt to enforce this judgment in
Oklahoma.
Process to enforce a money judgment rendered by a federal
district court is usually a writ of execution under Fed.R.Civ.P.
69, with the procedure on execution conforming to the practice and
procedure of the state in which the District Court sits, except to
the extent that an applicable federal statute provides otherwise.2

The Court does not find authority to extinguish judgment. The
Oklahoma Statutes refer to a judgment becoming dormant.
For a list of federal statutes which govern executions, see
Notes of Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 69.

7 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal Practice 569.04[3], citing Fink v. O'Neill.
106 U.S. 272, 1 S.Ct.

325, 27 L.Ed.

196

(1882).

The

court

determines that no federal statute is applicable. Therefore, state
law governs on this issue before the court.
The effective duration of a judgment is limited by the state's
dormancy statute.

Oklahoma's dormancy statute is codified at 12

O.S. 1981 §735:
"If execution is not issued and filed as
provided in Section 759 of this title, within
five (5) years after the date of any judgment
that now is or may hereafter be rendered, in
any court of record in this state, or if five
(5) years has intervened between the date that
the last execution on such judgment was filed
as provided by Section 759 of this title and
the date that writ of execution was filed as
also provided in Section 759 of this title,
such judgment shall become unenforceable and
of no effect, and shall cease to operate as a
lien on the real estate of the judgment
debtor...."
and §739:
"A. When a general execution is issued and
placed in the custody of a sheriff for levy,
a certified copy of such execution shall be
filed in the office of the county clerk of the
county whose sheriff holds such execution and
shall be indexed the same as judgments.
"B. If a general or special execution is
levied upon lands and tenements, the sheriff
shall endorse on the face of the writ the legal
description and shall have three disinterested
persons who have taken an oath to impartially
appraise the property so levied on, upon actual
view; and such disinterested persons shall
return to the officer their signed estimate of
the real value of said property.
"C. To extend a judgment lien beyond the
initial or any subsequent statutory period,
prior to the expiration of such period, a
certified copy of a general execution thereon
shall be filed and indexed in the same manner
as judgments in the office of the county clerk

2

in the county in which the judgment was
rendered and in the office of the county clerk
in each county in which the judgment was filed
and the lien thereof is sought to be retained."
Any Oklahoma judgment may become unenforceable if not executed upon
within five years from rendition of the judgment.

First of Denver

Mortgage Investors v. Riqqs, 692 P.2d 1358, 1361 (Okla. 1984).

A

judgment creditor who files but does not execute the judgment in
Oklahoma cannot revive the judgment after it has become, dormant by
making a second filing.

Id. at 1362.

A judgment becomes dormant

when the judgment creditor fails to obtain a writ of execution on
a judgment within five years of date of original judgment, even
though the judgment debtor had made several attempts to satisfy the
judgment by garnishment.

Chandler-Frates & Reitz v. Kostich, 630

P.2d 1287 (Okla. 1981).

Oklahoma strictly applies her dormancy

statutes to foreign judgments.

First of Denver Mortgage Investors

v. Riggs, 692 P.2d 1358 (Okla. 1984).

Oklahoma's dormant judgment

statutes are to be strictly construed and the courts generally
refuse to engraft exceptions to them other than those contained in
the statutes themselves.

Thomas v. Murray, 49 P. 2d 1080 (Okla.

1935).
If the judgment is not executed on within the five-year period
prescribed by statute, it becomes dormant and is not subject to
being revived.

Oklahoma's revivor statutes, 12 O.S. 1961, §§ 1071,

1072 and 1077 were repealed in 1965 by Laws, 1965, Ch. 299, p. 535,
and an attempted revivor after that date is a nullity, except to
the extent of 12 O.S. 1971, §1081(b).
589, 590 (Okla. 1974).

3

Palmer v. Belford, 527 P.2d

The evidence before the Court reveals a writ of execution was
issued in Minidoka County, Idaho on May 5, 1983, but was never
filed in Idaho nor In Oklahoma. Plaintiff shows the execution was
placed in the sherifffs hands but was returned with no property
found.

The writ was never filed.

/SyThe Tenth Circuit affirms the application

of Oklahoma's

dormant judgment statutes. Inaerton v. First National Bank & Trust
Co., 291 F.2d 662 (10th Cir. 1961).

The statute is clear on its

face that a writ of execution must be issued and filed in the State
qf_Oklahoma within five years from the date of judgment.

The

Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of 12 O.S. 1981
§§ 735 and 759. Therefore, the judgment entered against Defendant
on September 21, 1982 is unenforceable. ^) Defendant's Motion to
Declare Judgment Dormant is sustained.
IT IS SO ORDERED this

/ / X - ^ day of July, 1988.

THOMAS R. BRETT
'
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

w

The Court does not rule on the enforceability of the judgment
in Utah or Idaho. That issue is determined by Utah's and Idaho's
law regarding foreign judgments and their enforceability.

4

